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Promoting Democracy with
Neither State Nor Security:
U.S. Democracy Promotion Efforts in the
Palestinian Territories from the Oslo Accords
By GEOFFREY SWENSON
I.
Though long a neglected afterthought, democracy promotion now constitutes
a major U.S foreign policy priority. The Soviet Union's demise freed the hand
of U.S. policymakers to deemphasize support for unsavory pro-American
regimes. Alongside the traditional tools of diplomatic pressure, economic
assistance and military intervention, direct foreign democracy assistance
plays an increasingly important role in U.S.-directed policy efforts. Thomas
Carothers has aptly pointed out that "[e]very American president over the last
30 years ... has ended up becoming substantially involved with democracy
promotion... President Obama will also very likely find himself confronted
with the issue of democracy promotion, and he will find that his approach
to it becomes one of the defining themes of his presidency, almost whether
he likes it or not."'
Government agencies occasionally channel democracy promotion aid directly
through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
Assistance, however, is usually outsourced to U.S.-based not-for-profit non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) or for-profit contractors. While Ameri-
can NGOs emphasize their neutrality, their work is more far-reaching than
many realize. These NGOs work with a target state's government institu-
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tions, civil society groups, and political parties to overhaul the target state's
political culture. Since aid organizations depend on the host government's
toleration, they generally assist both opposition and pro-government groups.
Democracy promoters consequently endure criticism for both bolstering and
undermining non-democratic regimes.
Despite the continuing backlash against the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, Micahel
McFaul correctly assesses that "democracy promotion as a foreign policy goal
has become increasingly acceptable throughout most of the international
community."2 Because friendly authoritarian governments in the Middle
East had historically provided easy access to oil and kept radical elements
in check, the region was notably exempted from America's expanding in-
terest in democracy promotion until the attacks of September 11, 2001. The
danger of terrorism spawned by authoritarian regimes required what some
observers describe as a bold new "strategy of freedom in the Middle East"
that placed democracy promotion at the heart of counterterrorism efforts.
While abundant rhetoric praises the merits of democratic governance and
the importance of fostering it abroad, concrete analysis of what democracy
promotion activities actually accomplish remains scarce. The Palestinian
Territories formed a major focal point of U.S. democracy promotion efforts;
often cited as one of former President George W. Bush's most dramatic
democratization failures and a stern warning for his successor. Yet, there is
surprisingly scant academic work about what democracy promoters were
actually doing there. The lack of scholarship is particularly unfortunate given
the substantial skepticism about democracy promotion in the Middle East
and beyond that has resulted from Hamas' victory. This article fills a gap in
the literature by examining democratization programming in detail during
a particularly crucial time - from the signing of the Oslo Accords to the rise
of Hamas after the 2006 legislative elections - in order to gauge the extent to
which these activities furthered democratization, their impact on overarch-
ing U.S. policy goals, and, mostly importantly the lessons they can offer for
future democracy promotion endeavors.
Section I offered the context for democracy promotion activities in the West
Bank and Gaza, both in relation to the United States' overarching strategic am-
bitions as well as the specific dynamics involved with democracy assistance
in the Palestinian territories. Section II offers analyses of NGOs' activities in
the West Bank and Gaza. After a brief overview of the political situation and
a broad look at the involvement of U.S. NGOs in the territories, the section
provides a detailed discussion of NGOs' specific activities in each of the four
major democracy promotion areas (elections, political party development,
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civil society, and governance and the rule of law) as well as their overall
impacts. As the US is only one international actor among many, this article
is bound to be only a partial snapshot of democracy promotion work in Pal-
estine. The number of actors and the range of activity make it impossible to
examine every program rigorously. Still, highlighting the work of the major
representative actors that constitute the main thrust of U.S. pro-democracy
efforts helps to illuminate the broader democratization agenda pursued by
the United States in this vital region and the consequences of those actions.
Finally, section III offers some overarching lessons learned by policymakers,
both inside and outside the Obama Administration, and practitioners from
over a decade of democracy promotion efforts in Palestine. As the territory
continues to receive substantial amounts of international aid, lessons from
the past remain highly relevant. Moreover, the successes and failures of the
work there can be illuminating for other post-conflict rebuilding situations.
As this article will show, democratic reform inevitably risks domestic and
regional instability, often hinders access to vital resources, and complicates
security arrangements. A more comprehensive understanding of the impact
of U.S. NGO efforts acknowledges the tensions between high-level govern-
ment policy pronouncements, competing U.S. foreign policy priorities, and
the specific NGO democracy promotion activities. The experience of NGOs
in Palestine suggests that NGOs enjoy far less independence than they often
claim and highlights the need for better coordinated strategy between donors
and implementers.
Success (or failure) in one area often produces dramatic consequences across
the board, as does the interplay among the sponsoring state, the host gov-
ernment, and the implementing NGOs. Even when the U.S. wholeheartedly
pursues democracy promotion, important policy tradeoffs with conflicting
values remain. The host government often experiences tensions between the
preferences of its own population and the accommodation of U.S. priorities.
Not all pleasures are complementary or even compatible, but meaningful
work is possible even in decidedly inhospitable environments.
II.
Overview
The architects of the 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) hoped to produce two viable, secure, and
independent states. The Oslo Accords established the Palestinian Author-
ity (PA) as the governing body of the independent Palestinian entity. The
87 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
PROMOTING DEMOCRACY WITH NEITHER STATE NOR SECURITY
PA featured an executive, a unicameral legislature, and a judiciary, which
Oslo's proponents believed was the foundation for the resolution of the
decades-long conflict. Though the agreement initially enjoyed widespread
cross-community support, it did not produce lasting peace.
While the Oslo framework now appears moribund, the government struc-
tures it established still endure. Oslo's provision for a strong executive directly
elected by the population initially was designed to strengthen then Chair-
man of the PLO (Yasser Arafat)'s ability to push the peace process forward.
While the executive is subject to checks from both the Palestinian Legislative
Council (PLC) and the judiciary, countervailing institutions remain relatively
weak. Palestinians now directly govern most Palestinian citizens in the West
Bank and Gaza. Israel, however, maintains a strong security presence and
heavily regulates movement within the Palestinian territories. Israel's ef-
forts to quash the Second Intifada further hindered the PA's already limited
capacity. A stable, democratic, and fully sovereign Palestinian state today
seems as distant as ever given the landslide victory of Hamas-a militant
organization that refuses to accept Israel's right to exist-in January 2006
legislative elections. This already difficult situation was further complicated
by Hamas' subsequent assertion of control over Gaza, effectively splitting
the Palestinian proto-state into two distinct entities.
U.S. NGO Involvement in Palestine
Palestine received well over $6 billion in international development assistance
in the interim period between the signing of the Oslo Accords and the 2006
PLC elections4 This amounts to more than "$300 per person per year since
the outbreak of the Second Intifada," one of the highest per capita amounts
of development assistance ever allocated. Democracy promotion activities
received only a relatively small portion of these funds with most going to
economic development and infrastructure projects. Still, the United States
invested heavily in Palestinian democracy.
Democracy promotion efforts generally fall into four distinct categories:
election assistance, political party development, strengthening civil society,
and promoting good governance and the rule of law.6 Each of these areas
has received heavy U.S. investment in the post-Oslo era. Even though they
overlap extensively in practice, analytic clarity favors examining these areas
separately.
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Elections
U.S. policymakers believed that free elections would empower moderate
Palestinian leadership capable of furthering the peace process. For them, elec-
tions represented a vital step toward a democratic Palestine and ultimately a
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The National Democratic Institute
(NDI) and the Carter Center were the primary implementers of election as-
sistance for the 1996 polls, the 2005 presidential and local elections, and the
2006 PLC elections. Both USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED) have actively financed election programming.
The International Republican Institute (IRI), NDI, the International Foun-
dation for Electoral Systems (IFES), and the Carter Center-often working
together-provided substantial election assistance. Preparation for the 1996
presidential and parliamentary election commenced in 1994, two years be-
fore the polls. Pre-election assessments outlined potential difficulties and
opportunities. NGOs monitored voter and candidate registration, helped
educate voters, party members, and election administrators about the elec-
tion process, resolved disputes over the polling process, and observed the
actual elections. American NGOs, most notably NDI, worked with local
monitoring organizations to develop an indigenous domestic monitoring
capacity. All NGOs issued comprehensive post-election reports and helped
resolve post-election disagreements.
These organizations conducted high-quality election monitoring. The Pales-
tinian public expressed widespread skepticism about whether the 1996 elec-
tions would be credible. While the transitional elections experienced some
administrative shortcomings and procedural irregularities, little evidence of
systematic fraud appeared. Subsequent elections featured imperfections, but
were largely free and fair. By engaging elections comprehensively, American
NGOs helped establish a reliable electoral process and built public legitimacy
for future elections.
The introduction of competitive elections confounded policymakers' expecta-
tions. Election results initially propped up Arafat's position-inflating hopes
that he would effectively facilitate the peace process and reign in anti-Israeli
violence. Consequently, the international community tolerated his rampant
corruption and steady slide toward authoritarianism. Even the election of
Mahmoud Abbas did little to build peace in early 2005. Hamas' triumph
in the January 2006 legislative elections highlights the paradox behind free
elections: they can both legitimize organizations that endorse violence while
concurrently refusing to accept the legitimacy of democratic institutions. Sus-
tainable democratization requires elections, but they are only one component.
89 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
PROMOTING DEMOCRACY WITH NEITHER STATE NOR SECURITY
Political Party Development
Political party assistance from the United States attempted to simultaneously
prop up and reform the ruling Fatah party-a thoroughly corrupt party with
pronounced anti-democratic tendencies -out of fear of the alternative. In-
ternational party aid did not begin in earnest until 2003, nearly seven years
after the 1996 elections; while technically available to all non-violent parties,
Fatah received the bulk of this assistance. NDI emphasized the long-term
structural development of Fatah and a multi-party system that marginalized
Hamas. Programming there centered on increasing knowledge about the role
of parties in a representative government and offering key party figures with
the necessary background needed to revitalize Palestinian political parties.
Assistance included registering new voters, honing communication and
outreach skills, policy and message development, survey and canvassing
assistance, and help with outreach to youth and women. Before the local
and PLC elections, aid became more campaign-focused with candidate and
activist trainings, creation of a major voter database, an extensive voter mobi-
lization campaign, and manuals on campaign management, voter targeting,
and fundraising.
Even though NGOs distributed only a small portion of this aid, an analysis
of U.S. party assistance would be incomplete without mentioning USAID's
massive support for Fatah's electioneering efforts. USAID spent roughly $2.3
million to bolster Fatah and undercut Hamas;7 assistance included paying
for advertisements and events praising the then Fatah-led Palestinian Au-
thority. USAID funded roughly 40 projects through Abbas' office including:
"a street cleaning campaign, distributing free food and water to Palestinians
at border crossings, donating computers to community centers and sponsor-
ing a national youth soccer tournament."8 In contrast, Hamas spent only $1
million on the entire campaign.
Despite certain gains, outside investment, produced few tangible results.
On the positive side, these investments likely did allow Fatah to run a better
campaign. Thousands of activists and candidates have been trained and voter
outreach techniques improved. And, given the desperate living situations
in much of the West Bank and Gaza, the patronage programs undoubtedly
swayed some voters However, Fatah not only lost power, but showed little
interest in reform. Indeed, Fatah's corruption and willingness to accom-
modate the United States and Israel no doubt helped to propel Hamas to
electoral victory.
Democracy promotion efforts reflected the deeply flawed assumption that
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Western-funded advertisements and development projects would make vot-
ers overlook the stalled peace process, steadily declining living conditions,
constant expansion of Israeli settlements, and Fatah's corruption. Party aid
has been largely ineffective, often even counterproductive. NDI and USAID
stressed their commitment to vibrant multi-party democracy, yet offered
massive technical and financial assistance to the hegemonic party. This aid
further distorted Fatah's already dysfunctional incentive structure. Not only
did Fatah possess the advantages of incumbency, it also could rely on fears
of a Hamas-led government to ensure it
Aid to Fatah would retain major donors' support. Aid
effectively functioned as a massive subsidy.
reinforced the This is not purely the fault of U.S. NGOs, as
general public's no other major party embraces non-violentdemocratic practices. It is not clear that
perception that party aid, as implemented, furthered the
"international goal of a vibrant, democratic multi-party
system.
tunding is driven by
the political agendas
of the international
community
rather than the
best interests of
the indigenous
population."
USAID's efforts to sway voters through pa-
tronage undermined any potential momen-
tum for reform. Fatah party members saw
little need to eliminate practices that alien-
ated voters, especially since virtually no
one predicted a Hamas victory. Aid to Fatah
reinforced the general public's perception
that "international funding is driven by the
political agendas of the international com-
munity rather than the best interests of the
indigenous population."
While U.S. NGOs emphasized their neutrality, political party assistance
became overtly partisan. Yet, policymakers consistently failed to accept the
tough choices intrinsic to promoting democratization in general-let alone
when the electorate lives under occupation and the area is prone to insta-
bility. Scott Wilson and Glenn Kessler identify the overarching tension in
simultaneously pursuing democratization and supporting favored parties:
Free elections in the Arab world, where most countries have
been run for years by unelected autocracies or unchallenged
parties like Fatah, often result in strong showings by radical
Islamic movements opposed to the policies of the United States
and to its chief regional ally, Israel. But in attempting to man-
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age the results, the [Bush] administration risks undermining
the democratic goals it is promoting.10
Civil Society
Since 1996, American democracy promoters, primarily funded by USAID,
have sought to bolster the capacity of moderate, indigenous advocacy NGOs
to influence the legislative process. Chemonics, IRI, NDI, the Academy for
Educational Development (AED), and the Search for Common Ground are
the major implementers of civil society assistance. Chemonics oversaw a $34
million program that ran from 2002 to 2006, designed to bolster Palestinian
NGOs to further democratization and promote the establishment of a vibrant,
democratic, and peaceful Palestinian state. Approximately half the money
went directly to local organizations. These activities ranged from civic forums
and voter education programs to a youth parliament and a blood pressure
monitoring initiative. The other funds supported technical assistance for
local groups through seminars and workshops.
IRI focused on crosscutting measures between the civil society and the legis-
lative branch from 1996 through 2003 focusing on establishing "polling and
surveying capabilities, a parliamentary research unit, and a policy dialogue
project."" This program built on the foundation of an earlier NED-sponsored
polling program. Since 2003, IRI also sought to enhance political involvement
"through a support network for Palestinian women interested in assuming a
more prominent role in public life." 12 NDI's civil society work established the
Civic Forum for group discussions, produced written materials on democratic
development, and training seminars and produced management, fundrais-
ing, strategic planning, and conflict resolution manuals. From 2002 through
2006, AED and the Search for Common Ground invested nearly $2 million
supporting a small core of local NGOs dedicated to promoting non-violence
and Palestinian-Israeli discourse. Sponsored activities included trainings on
conflict resolution, effective advocacy, message development, and organiza-
tional capacity building.
In contrast to their political party development efforts, the United States'
funding for civil society programming produced some notable results. As-
sociation with American NGOs provided protection for partner groups from
both the Palestinian and Israeli authorities-a major benefit given the fluid
security situation and the PA's authoritarian tendencies. Thousands of activ-
ists benefited from trainings. Local NGOs received much needed funding
and material aid. Aid meant local organizations could provide much-needed
social services and increase their political advocacy. Moreover, many indig-
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enous NGOs owe their survival largely to U.S. support.
However, involvement in civil society also has a dark side. Many organiza-
tions respond directly to the wishes of foreign donors. Consequently, prob-
lems frequently stem from disconnections between the donors' wishes and
the local population's priorities. American NGOs initially enhanced the cred-
itability of recipient organizations. Over time, however, groups dependent
on foreign funds emerged as a distinct, widely disliked social group. These
organizations lost substantial popular legitimacy due to their alienation from
the community at large and lack of accountability."
Funding decisions have equally dramatic consequences for NGOs not favored
by the international community. As Israel had outlawed the major Palestin-
ian political parties prior to the Oslo Accords, civil society "served in a wide
range semi-representative capacities and provided a wide range of services
up to and including the First Intifada." 14 NGOs and other international ac-
tors wrought havoc on many longstanding local organizations, which also
desperately needed funding, by favoring groups with a more Western ori-
entation. Donors and NGOs failed to maximize opportunities to contribute
to a robust, sustainable, and largely organic civil society in the West Bank
and Gaza by generally failing to engage with many preexisting grassroots
institutions. Western support for civil society development, including direct
monetary assistance, is not intrinsically destructive. It can play a vital role
in supporting an energetic, representative civil society sector and has done
so on occasion in Palestine. Though civil society in Palestine continues to
rank among the most dynamic in the region, U.S. assistance has fallen far
short of its goals and may have retarded the very progress that U.S. NGOs
intended to advance.
Governance and the Rule of Law
Establishing credible, effective, and representative government institutions
supported by the rule of law is inevitably difficult. Palestine presents a
particularly daunting case because conflict resolution, state building, and
democratization must all occur simultaneously, even as the West Bank and
Gaza remained under Israeli influence. Not surprisingly given the magnitude
of the challenge, governance and rule of law programs have received major
international investment.
Associates in Rural Development (ARD) played the primary role in assisting
the PLC's institutional development from 1999 through 2004. ARD worked
to enhance the PLC's internal administration and executive oversight abili-
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ties. ARD also sought to strengthen the PLC's "deliberative and legislative
capacity by implementing a three-pronged program: clarifying the legislative
process; enhancing access to expertise and information by the Council; and
institutionalizing an improved approach to drafting and reviewing laws by
committees.""s These efforts included holding workshops, drafting train-
ing materials, and providing direct material aid. Assistance went beyond
the technical and institutional aspects of the legislative process, extending
to public relations, office management,
and policy communications. NDI has also Hamas' victory
played a role in this area, most notably
supporting the drafting process of the Pal- exemplifies the often
estinian foundational law. non-linear pattern of
From 1999 to 2004, DPK Consulting over- democratization.
saw a major rule of law initiative imple-
menting "automated case management systems, bench books for judges,
standardized forms and operations manuals" with partner courts for potential
nationwide use.16 DPK also modernized case processing methods, trained
prosecutors, underwrote improvement to research facilities and sponsored
legal workshops. Since 2004 Chemonics has continued this work by part-
nering with local actors to push for legal reform, funding improvement to
Palestinian law schools, and supporting professional and student legal as-
sociations. Finally, AMIDEAST implemented a modest rule program from
1999 to 2002 that sought to develop continuing education and apprenticeship
opportunities, and establish a legal practitioner code of conduct.
On a structural level, assistance from the U.S. Government proved vital to the
establishment and continued maintenance of distinct executive, judicial, and
legislative branches. While they continue to face major problems - including
rampant corruption and waste - their very existence of these three discrete
branches constitutes a major success. They were constructed from scratch in
a very difficult environment. U.S. NGOs also made notable contributions.
The entire PLC membership and most staff (at least prior to the 2006 elec-
tions) received training and assistance. Along with the administrative and
material assistance, these activities enhanced the capacities of members and
the PLC as an institution. Likewise, judicial aid had visible impact, aiding
the Palestinian judiciary in becoming extremely independent, especially in
comparison to the rest of the Arab world. Palestinian legal institutions and
law schools face chronic resource shortages that U.S. funding helps alleviate.
Though many challenges remain, aid generated tangible improvements to
the court system and the legal academy.
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Assistance, however, is only one factor in the political economy of reform. In
response to the Second Intifada, Israel worked to systematically dismantle the
PA and cut off vital tax revenues in response to Hamas' triumph in the 2006
PLC elections. As long as the two entities
While U.S. remain so unequal, long-term stability and
secure democratic government in Palestine
government- appears highly unlikely.
funded NGOs
often stress their
indeendece, hey As President Obama seeks to jumpstartindependence, they the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and
possess only limited promote democracy in the Palestinian ter-
discretion; rather, ritories (while simultaneously avoiding theBush administration's foreign policy mis-
the government has steps) he has much to learn from democracy
almost unilaterally promotion efforts during this crucial time.American policymnakers and NGOs cannot
designed the be faulted for lacking ambition. They at-
American democracy tempted to reform and support Fatah, con-struct a viable state backed by free elections,
promotion and foster a vibrant civil society-all against
progra ming.a backdrop of intense conflict. The limitedprogrmting
successes and larger failures highlight the
important policy tradeoffs that inevitably
exist in democracy promotion. Even programs with the best intentions often
have unintended negaaive consequences.
Election assistance presents the most obvious example. Election assistance
ranks as the most successful programming area, at least from a technical
perspective, because it nornalized free and fair elections. But in the 2006
PLC elections, voters designated Hamas-an extremist group that supports
the use of violence against Israel-as the legitimate governing party. The
election process may be sound, but the results unsavory. Nevertheless, elec-
tions, regardless of their outcome, have helped instituionalize credible vot-
ing procedures in a territory with lite previous experience with democratic
rule. An established norm of free elections could check the party or parties
in power regardless of their ideology. Indeed, Hamas' victory exemplifies
the often non-linear pattern of democraization.
Tensions also frequently exist, though generally unacknowledged by both
donors and implementers, between the various facets of democracy promo-
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tion. Activities, even when underwritten by the same organization (such as
USAID), too often do not adequately take into account the ramifications of
other programming decisions. Party assistance prior to the 2006 PLC elections
provides a dramatic illustration. NGOs stressed that Fatah must reform, while
USAID labored to insulate Fatah from the
voters' wrath. Backed by incumbency and
foreign investment, Fatah believed it could
escape accountability for its rampant cor-
ruption. It made no effort to reform. This, in
turn, made local organizations, particularly
groups not directly backed by Westerners,
more skeptical about moderate politicians.
Deep-seated political problems rarely have
technical answers. Democracy is merely
an abstraction-albeit an invaluable one-
that serves as a benchmark to evaluate the
actual practice of government. To have a
real impact, democracy promotion activi-
ties must be willing to confront the tough
issues, such as corruption, lack of political
infrastructure, and lingering bitterness
between former adversaries, rather than
merely trying to alleviate a supposed lack
of knowledge or deficiency of material
resources. As Michelle Dunne argues in
The rigidity with
which NGOs
generally parrot
overarching U.S.
policies highlights
the need for more
leeway for NGOs
to act as honest
brokers capable of
gaining the trust of
partners rather than
as mere proxies for
the government.
reference to democracy promotion in the Middle East during this time,
"USAID... has understandably chosen to work in areas such as civil soci-
ety, local government, judicial reform, and women's rights that seemed the
easiest and least sensitive... with little assessment of areas in which reform
would be most meaningful."
The ad hoc quality of many democracy programs illustrates the need for
more comprehensive strategic planning. Successful programming must
reflect local realities and demonstrate a willingness to seize opportunities,
but also refrain from prioritizing short-term gains at the cost of long-term
setbacks. Democracy promotion in Palestine highlights the reality that a
fuller understanding the impact of U.S. efforts work requires contextualiz-
ing programming within the overarching policy apparatus. In other words,
the relationship between NGOs and the U.S. government has a substantial
impact on both program implementation and results.
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A better strategic paradigm demands critical reflection. Thus, improved
programming requires taking evaluation seriously at both the level of indi-
vidual programs and countries. USAID, NED, and U.S. democracy promotion
NGOs frequently resist even minor criticisms. Outside evaluators contracted
by USAID to analyze their programming may be hesitant to make earnest
assessments since a review that the agency deems unfair could jeopardize fu-
ture contracts. In an extremely competitive
marketplace, NGOs suffer from a pervasive
The romantic fear that existing funds will evaporate and
imagery ofnew funds will be directed elsewhere. Theyof are understandably apprehensive about
chivalrous defenders their budget being slashed by a Congress
of feedo briging perpetually skeptical of foreign aid. Build-of freedom bringing ing on past successes and learning from
democracy to the failures requires a willingness to critically
examine earlier decisions. For such a system
benighted masses to develop, Congress and the administra-
contrasts with the tion must collaborate to adopt a more nu-
anced approach to democracy promotion
tedious truth of rather than placing a premium on immedi-
'rrh1- A ate results.
promotion actually Pursuing democratization in conflict-prone
entails. areas raises additional issues not necessar-ily present in more stable regions. This shift
requires relinquishing some convenient fic-
tions in favor of some inconvenient truths. While U.S. government-funded
NGOs often stress their independence, they possess only limited discretion;
rather, the government has almost unilaterally designed the American de-
mocracy promotion programming. In many ways, policy implementation has
simply been outsourced to NGOs. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell's
description of NGOs as "force multiplier[s]" in the service of U.S. policy
contains much truth." The rigidity with which NGOs generally parrot
overarching U.S. policies highlights the need for more leeway for NGOs to
act as honest brokers capable of gaining the trust of partners rather than as
mere proxies for the government. On a deeper level, the tight nexus between
democracy NGOs and the government foreign policy apparatus means that
high-level government policymakers should consider the impact of their ac-
tions on democratization rather than simply blaming shortcomings on NGOs.
The decisions of NGOs, donors, and high-level policymakers leave plenty
of room for improvement, but they have made some critical contributions.
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For example, their work to strengthen Palestine's judiciary has made a major
contribution to establishing the rule of law and perhaps, eventually, offering
a meaningful check on the still overpowered PA executive. Both peace and
democracy will remain elusive without the emergence of a Palestinian state
that has the capacity to deal with its citizens' legal claims legitimately and
effectively.
Given the realities of Palestine and the limited results of democracy promo-
tion there, President Obama's appropriate response is not abandonment.
Rather, he should pursue lofty goals checked by modest expectations, both of
which should be underwritten by an unwavering commitment to democratic
ideals. The administration's recent announcement of a holistic review of de-
velopment policy may provide a good first step. Representative government
offers too much promise to languish simply because promoting democracy
proved more difficult than initially assumed. Democracy promotion efforts
must be made smarter rather than curtailed. The romantic imagery of chiv-
alrous defenders of freedom bringing democracy to the benighted masses
contrasts with the tedious truth of what democracy promotion actually
entails. Unfortunately, no gallant steeds or broadswords are involved, just
voter education and electoral system design. Bold ideological battles or titanic
shifts remain rare. Policymakers and American NGOs alike must own up to
the hard realities of the craft: promoting democracy is slow and hard work
that can take many seasons to bear fruit. m
- Erlend Vestad served as the lead editor of this article.
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